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CONTEMPLATING THE ENDGAME: AN EVOLUTIONARY
MODEL FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION
Eric C. Chaffee*

I. INTRODUCTION
Chess is a game of stages and transitions consisting of an opening, a
middlegame, and an endgame. In Last Lectures, former world chess
champion José Raúl Capablanca writes, “[I]n order to improve your
game, you must study the endgame before anything else; for, whereas
the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middlegame
and the opening must be studied in relation to the endgame.” 1 This
concept can be applied to any transitional process that involves various
stages. One must begin by contemplating the desired conclusion, and
then one must determine the path to that conclusion. Using this process,
desired ends are more likely to be achieved, and they are likely to be
achieved more easily. Put another way, simply living in the now during
a transitional process can have negative consequences because one has
not contemplated desired goals or the best path to achieving them.
Yet, in the realm of international securities law, many regulators and
commentators are satisfied with simply living in the now without
determining what an ideal system of international securities law should
look like or how such a system of law could be achieved. Of course
some regulators and commentators are satisfied with the current system
of international securities law that has evolved in the past few decades.2
However, many believe that this model of regulatory competition is

* Associate Professor and Chair of the Project for Law and Business Ethics, University of
Dayton School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University.
I would like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her editorial comments and encouragement while drafting
this essay. I would also like to thank Professor Barbara Black and the editorial board of the The
University of Cincinnati Law Review for inviting me to participate in their symposium and to contribute
to this symposium issue. The views set forth in this essay are completely my own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of any employer or client either past or present.
1. JOSÉ RAÚL CAPABLANCA, LAST LECTURES 19 (1966) (providing a world chess champion’s
views on the game of chess).
2. See generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (arguing for a regulatory competition approach to
international securities regulation).
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simply an unfortunate byproduct of the nationalistic and protectionist
attitudes of many nations, and a reality that cannot be overcome. 3
Although some benefits exist to the regulatory competition that is
occurring among individual nations attempting to attract issuers,
investors, and a variety of other market participants, the harms created
by such a model of international securities law far outweigh those
benefits. 4 This is because patchwork regulation does not work to
effectively and efficiently regulate securities markets. This was proven
in the United States during the 1920s when a patchwork of state law was
used to regulate the national securities markets. 5 This patchwork proved
ineffective resulting in the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression. 6 In response to these events, Congress enacted the
Securities Act of 1933 7 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 8
Because of the harmonized and centralized system of national securities
regulation created by these acts, the United States’ national markets
enjoyed relative stability for the remainder of the twentieth century.
The financial crisis that began in 2008 also evidences that patchwork
regulation is ineffective in regulating securities markets. In the past few
decades, global securities markets have begun to emerge, and national
and regional based systems of securities law have created a patchwork
of securities regulation on the international level. 9 This patchwork of
regulation has created competition among nations and regions to attract
issuers, investors, and other market participants. 10 In terms of the
financial crisis that began in 2008, this created a race-to-the-bottom in
international securities regulation in which no nation wanted to ratchet
up the level of regulation or enforcement relating to the mortgagebacked securities that were at the heart of the crisis, fearing that it would
render their nation or region less competitive. 11 Because of this, the
3. See Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 236 (2008) (“Foreign jurisdictions historically have expressed hostility to any
extension of U.S. trading and liability standards to their markets, and the SEC has expressed skepticism
about the standards of most prominent foreign exchanges.”).
4. See infra Part II.C (explaining the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition model
of international securities regulation).
5. See infra Part IV.A (providing an overview of the development of securities regulation in the
United States).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the reasons for the emergence of global securities markets).
10. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1435 (2008) (arguing that regulatory competition is the foundation of the emerging model of
international securities law).
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. &
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financial crisis that began in 2008 ensued. 12 In addition to similar
causes, the Great Depression and the financial crisis that began in 2008
are similar in terms of severity. Notably, the financial crisis that began
in 2008 has been referred to as the “most severe financial crisis since the
Great Depression,” 13 the “Great Recession,” 14 and even a depression
itself. 15 Put simply, regulatory fragmentation creates a race-to-thebottom in any system of securities regulation that generates dire results.
Although some benefits may exist to regulatory competition, these
benefits are outweighed by this reality. 16
Ideally, the world should adopt an approach to international securities
regulation that is similar to the approach used by the United States in
response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression. The securities laws throughout the world should be
harmonized to allow for the creation of a centralized global securities
regulator with monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers. This
centralized global securities regulator should then set a baseline of
regulation from which individual nations or regions can choose to
upwardly depart, if desired. Such a system of international securities
regulation will prevent a race-to-the-bottom in international securities
law and avoid other collective action problems by creating a floor for
regulation and a centralized actor to enforce this baseline system of
securities law. 17
The problem is that this is a drastic and unrealistic proposal in the
short-term because of the nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of
BUS. REV. 191, 193 (2008) (“The global scale of the current troubles shows that other countries have
been too lax as well, so that there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the
United States, but worldwide.”).
12. Id.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 2
(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (discussing the
financial crisis that began in 2008).
14. But see Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX
(Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-briefetymology (“Nobody can take credit for coining the term ‘The Great Recession’ . . . . Why? Because
the ‘Great Recession of 2008’ is not the first recession to be slapped with the lofty title. Every recession
of the last several decades has, at some point or another, received this special designation.”).
15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION x (2009) (“It is the gravity of the economic downturn, the radicalism of the
government’s responses, and the pervading sense of crisis that mark what the economy is going through
as a depression.”).
16. See infra Part II.C (discussing the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition model
of international securities regulation).
17. See infra Part III (discussing the benefits of an approach based on harmonization and
centralization in international securities law, including that such an approach helps to stabilize the
emerging global securities markets, benefits market participants, and assists the United States in
maintaining a dominant role as a securities regulator).
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many securities regulators. 18 Although the emerging global capital
markets have begun to fuel the convergence of many business norms, 19
the world does not seem ready for a centralized global securities
regulator with robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers.
This reality drives some commentators and regulators to simply live in
the now without hope for obtaining the benefits that harmonization and
centralization would provide.
In this Article, I argue that the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law should and must occur through a slow
evolutionary process, rather than a rapid revolutionary process, because
only under these circumstances will a centralized global securities
regulator be able to emerge. In other articles, I have discussed the
opportunity that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents for
reforming international securities regulation, 20 the necessity for
comprehensive domestic and international regulatory reform to prevent
future financial crises, 21 the need for harmonization and centralization of
international securities law, 22 the government’s role in the
harmonization and centralization of international securities regulation,23
and the need for a centralized global securities regulator. 24 This Article
extends that previous scholarship in three main ways. First, it advocates
for long-term planning in the area of international securities regulation,
rather than simply existing in the now. Second, it addresses one of the
most commonly cited barriers to harmonization and centralization,
which is that the current nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of
most securities regulators will not allow for harmonization and
centralization of international securities law. Third, this Article details a
18. See infra Part II.C (discussing the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition
approach to international securities regulation).
19. But see George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA–CREF Response to A Blueprint for
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 100
(2007) (“Still, as a result of both historical and cultural influences, other countries may have differing
standards for disclosure that are either less stringent or based on different assumptions than those found
in the U.S. markets. For example, some foreign markets may have different cultural or legal views
towards insider trading.”).
20. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010).
21. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis that Began in 2008: The Need
for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009).
22. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for Harmonization and
Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010).
23. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States
Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 (2010).
24. See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities Regulation: A
Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 1, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
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mechanism for moving toward harmonization and centralization, i.e., a
long-term approach that allows for international regulation to evolve
along with the emerging global capital markets.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II
discusses the current state of international securities regulation and the
need for a new approach to international securities law by focusing on
the globalization of securities markets, the spectrum of approaches to
international securities law, and the dangers of transitioning to a
regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation.
Part III explains the benefits of the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law, including that such an approach helps
stabilize the emerging global securities markets, benefits market
participants, and assists the United States in maintaining a dominant role
as a securities regulator. Part IV describes the evolutionary process
through which the harmonization and centralization of international
securities can be achieved by providing two case studies of the use of
such an evolutionary process, providing a comparative analysis of both
those case studies, and describing possible paths toward a harmonized
and centralized system of international securities regulation. This
Article concludes that harmonization and centralization offers the best
approach to international securities law, and that the long-term
evolutionary process toward a harmonized and centralized system must
be started.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
AND THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
An evolutionary approach to international securities regulation is
necessary because securities markets are evolving, transitioning from
being national or regional in nature to being global. A new approach to
international securities law is needed to meet the challenges presented
by these emerging global securities markets. In this Part, the reasons for
the transition to global securities markets, the possible models for
international securities regulation, and the dangers of adopting a
regulatory competition approach to international securities law will be
explored. Ultimately, international securities law will have to evolve to
meet the realities of the emerging global securities markets. With that
said, the evolution of regulation should be in the direction of
harmonization and centralization.
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A. The Emergence of Global Capital Markets
For much of the twentieth century, the United States was viewed as
having the world’s premier capital markets and premier system of
securities regulation. 25 From this position of dominance, the United
States was able to fuel convergence in international securities regulation
by convincing other nations and regions to adopt securities laws that
mirrored the securities laws in the United States. 26 With the advent of
the twenty-first century, however, the United States’ dominance has
waned as global securities markets have emerged because of the rise of
strong securities markets throughout the world, the evolution of
securities trading, the evolution of securities exchanges, and concerns
over aggressive regulation in the United States.
In the past few decades, global securities markets have begun to
emerge because of the rise of strong national securities markets
throughout the world. For much of the twentieth century, the capital
markets in the United States were unique in terms of the breadth and
depth of available capital. 27 During the twenty-first century, however,
the securities markets in the United States have been challenged by
strong markets in Asia, Europe, and South America. 28 The capital

25. See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
105, 119 (2007) (“For much of the twentieth century, the Commission justly considered itself to be the
world’s premier securities market regulator. But with the passage of time, the capital markets of many
other countries have developed and the supervisory capabilities of many jurisdictions have expanded—
often with the assistance of advice from the SEC or the International Organization of Securities
Commissions. Today, a number of these jurisdictions provide capital market oversight that is
substantially equivalent to SEC supervision.”).
26. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 1711
(2008) (“Since the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation, it is not surprising that
as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European capital markets, it has looked to U.S. securities
regulation as a model. Yet, changing economics, and in particular the migration of many international
issuers to the London markets, has given the EU more power in influencing the SEC. The SEC can no
longer take a unilateralist approach to securities regulation and assume that the U.S. markets will remain
the premier capital markets.”).
27. See Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 100 (“The SEC performs its task admirably—and
sets the standard against which all other regulators around the globe are judged. . . . The SEC, with its
track record and high standards for protecting investors, has historically been a leader in setting
benchmarks for market regulation.”); Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of
Foreign Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as
the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II,
the United States has been the world’s principal capital market. This market has been uniquely broad
and deep, with substantial retail participation by individual investors and small institutions, plentiful
capital for equity financing and a willingness to hold long-term debt securities, with tenors [sic] of thirty
years beings common even for corporate issuers.”).
28. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 117 (“The securities markets outside the United States
have grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty years and now afford issuers in their
home countries significant opportunities for financing that did not previously exist.”).
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markets in the European Union have grown in both size and
sophistication, 29 and the markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China,
which are often referred to as “BRIC countries,” offer new opportunities
for investment and raising capital. 30
The rise of strong securities markets has helped fuel an evolution in
securities trading. Retail and institutional investors now look globally
for investment opportunities as a means of portfolio diversification and
to offset currency fluctuations. 31 Moreover, issuers now have the ability
to raise capital on a global basis and make decisions based on where
capital can be obtained at the lowest cost. 32 Broker–dealers, investment
advisors, and other market participants continue to adapt to securities
markets that have begun to transcend national borders. 33 The role of
technology in this process cannot be understated. The internet and other
forms of communication make investment opportunities available on a
global basis, rather than confining their availability to any particular
nation or region. 34
29. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the efforts of the European Union to build a common capital
market among its member states); see also Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock
Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 363 (2007)
(“The European markets have matured to a point where capital can be raised there to meet the needs of
most companies. Foreign, and even some U.S. companies, engaging in IPOs or stock exchange listings
have done so in Europe, rather than in the United States.”).
30. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1711–12 (“The EU is not the only challenge to the SEC,
however. The new strong capital markets in Asia and South America, and in particular in the so-called
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), challenge both the EU and the SEC to shape their
regulatory approaches to foreign issuers and foreign financial institutions so as not to lose their
competitive places as market regulators.”).
31. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global
Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 85–86 (2007) (“Investing in non-U.S. markets is no longer the
exclusive province of megainstitutions or the ultrawealthy; it is an essential component of prudent
portfolio diversification for all [U.S.] investors.”).
32. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities in record
numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings in the U.S. to raise capital.”).
33. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 107 (“[I]ssuers are not the only entities with mobility in
modern capital markets: investors, exchanges, brokerage houses, and a wide range of professional
service providers can and do move around the world.”).
34. See Greene, supra note 31, at 86 (“The rise of the internet has given investors a new window
on the world and access to almost limitless information. A natural outgrowth of this technological
revolution, coupled with increasing investor sophistication and the need for financial diversification that
transcends home country borders, is the understandable desire of investors to communicate and effect
transactions directly with market participants located in other jurisdictions.”); Susan Wolburgh Jenah,
Commentary on a Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International
Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–70 (2007) (“Globalization is a fact. Innovative technologies
are driving faster and more efficient trading, and they do not recognize national borders. . . . The impact
of these changes is profound and not yet fully realized.”); Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 99 (“The
rapid pace of technological advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital
market. In such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, greater diversification, and
a wider range of investment options regardless of their location. Capital would be more efficiently
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The emergence of global securities markets has also been fueled by
the evolution of securities exchanges. In the past two decades, a wave
of securities exchange demutualization has transformed many exchanges
into for-profit entities. 35 The pressures created by for-profit status have
caused many exchanges to eschew previous nationalistic and
protectionist tendencies to explore profit-making opportunities on a
global basis. 36 The wave of securities exchange demutualization has led
to a wave of securities exchange consolidation. 37 On April 4, 2007, the
merger of the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext gave birth to the
world’s first transnational stock exchange. 38 In the past few years, the
push for stock exchange consolidation has continued to aid in the
breaking down of national and regional capital markets and the building
up of global ones in their place. 39
The United States is also fueling the emergence of global capital
markets by pursuing aggressive regulation of its securities markets.
Many issuers, investors, and other market participants have begun
seeking opportunities in other nations because of the United States’
culture of aggressive shareholder litigation and history of aggressive
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 40 In
addition, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 41 (Sarbanes–Oxley) placed
significant new corporate governance requirements on entities wishing
to issue securities in the United States, which has limited the number of
foreign initial public offerings within its borders. 42
Aggressive
allocated throughout the global economy to the benefit of all participants.”).
35. See Karmel, supra note 29, at 356 (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of
exchanges is that exchanges have demutualized and become public companies. They need to please
their shareholders as well as their customers. Further, in the process of moving from mutual not-forprofit citadels of capitalism to public companies, national exchanges have lost their exclusivity and their
mystique.”).
36. Id.
37. Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 136 (2007) (“Demutualization and increased competition has led to a wave
of consolidation by the European exchanges.”).
38. See generally Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly
Transnational Exchange?, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008); Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation
and Models of International Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151 (2007).
39. See Jenah, supra note 34, at 71 (“This chess game of proposed exchange mergers, capital tieups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears witness to the truism that capital markets
are global.”).
40. See Karmel, supra note 29, at 356–57 (“[T]he primary reasons why the NYSE has been
losing listings is that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock market because of the costs of
compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley) and because of
the U.S. culture of shareholder litigation.”).
41. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201–7266 (2006)).
42. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 118 (reporting on the limited number of initial public
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regulation in the United States has helped speed the emergence of global
capital markets. Even if the United States weakened the regulation of its
securities markets, however, the emergence of global capital markets
seems impossible to stop.
B. The Spectrum of Approaches to International Securities Law
The emergence of global capital markets offers the opportunity to reimagine international securities regulation. Although the world has
started drifting toward a regulatory competition model of international
securities law, this does not mean that it is the ideal system of
regulation. In this Part, six possible models for international securities
regulation will be explored. These six approaches are privatization,
regulatory competition, regulatory convergence, mutual recognition,
regulatory harmonization, and regulatory centralization. These six
approaches to international securities law can be placed on a spectrum
based on the amount of international cooperation and coordination
required to bring each of them into being. Privatization would be at one
end of the spectrum because it requires the least international
cooperation and coordination, and centralization would be at the other
end of the spectrum because it requires the most. In traveling from
privatization to centralization on the spectrum, one would pass through
regulatory competition, convergence, mutual recognition, and
harmonization. Obviously, these approaches can overlap and blur.
Under a privatization approach to international securities regulation,
private actors would be responsible for regulating the emerging global
capital markets. In most models of privatization, securities exchanges
are the private actors that are responsible for both regulation and
enforcement. Although this model might seem to be a radical approach
to securities regulation, the United States actually employed this
approach domestically prior to the adoption of state securities laws, i.e.
the so-called blue sky laws, in the 1910s and 1920s. 43 Although a
privatization approach to international securities regulation could have
some benefits, this type of approach is unlikely to emerge on the
offerings from Europe and Asia after the adoption of Sarbanes–Oxley). But see Jackson, supra note 25,
at 108 (“Although many have pointed to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as damaging
the ability of U.S. exchanges to compete for foreign cross-listings, there is ample evidence that the
erosion of U.S. market power for foreign listings was already underway well before 2002.”).
43. See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 661 (2001) (explaining that “the full privatization of
securities regulation, would, in the United States, turn back the clock nearly a full century, not just
before the New Deal, but further back, before the dawning of the first Blue Sky laws of the early
1900s”).
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international level. Most securities regulators, issuers, investors, and
other market participants have become comfortable with securities
regulation by governmental entities, which means that the privatization
of international securities regulation is likely infeasible.
Regulatory competition constitutes a second approach to international
securities regulation.
Under a regulatory competition approach,
individual nations or regions adopt systems of securities regulation and
then compete to attract issuers, investors, and other market participants.
The world is currently transitioning to a regulatory competition
approach to international securities law. As explained in the next Part, a
regulatory competition approach is not the best model to regulate the
emerging global capital markets because patchwork regulation creates a
race-to-the-bottom in terms of international securities law, produces
various regulatory and enforcement gaps, and generates various
collective action problems. 44
Regulatory convergence offers a third approach to international
securities regulation. Convergence can be divided into weak and strong
forms. Under a weak regulatory convergence approach, nations
gravitate toward similar systems of securities regulation. If a dominant
actor exists and that actor is willing to invest adequate resources into the
development of its system of securities law, a race-to-the-top may occur.
If a dominant actor does not exist, nations will compete, and a regulatory
competition model will emerge. As previously explained, this will
generate a race-to-the-bottom, although quality regulation may still be
adopted in certain discrete instances. 45 For much of the twentieth
century, the United States was able to fuel convergence of the world’s
securities laws because the United States was viewed as having the
world’s premier capital markets and premier system of securities
regulation. 46 The United States is still trying to fuel convergence
through various efforts, including the SEC’s International Technical
Assistance Program. 47 However, the dominance of the United States is
waning as global capital markets emerge. 48 Thus, the United States no

44. See infra Part II.C (explaining the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition
approach to international securities regulation).
45. See Jenah, supra note 34, at 77 (“The challenge . . . is to strike the right balance between a
healthy degree of regulatory competition and proverbial ‘race to the bottom.’”).
46. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical
Assistance Program, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (last visited June 22,
2010) (“Utilizing a faculty of senior SEC and industry officials, and seasoned practitioners, the technical
assistance program provides training to nearly 2000 regulatory and law enforcement officials from over
100 countries.”).
48. See Greene, supra note 31, at 85 (“There can be no argument that the securities markets are
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longer has the same ability to fuel convergence.
Under a strong regulatory competition approach to international
securities regulation, nations agree to certain regulatory norms via treaty
or other agreements. The signatories then adopt systems of securities
regulation that codify these norms. Although this type of approach can
create a relatively consistent level of regulation, the actual codification
of the norms can vary greatly. In addition, this approach also leaves
regulatory and enforcement gaps between nations. The effectiveness of
this approach to transnational securities regulation remains open to
question because of the variation in regulation that it generates and the
potential for lack of consistent enforcement. 49
Regulatory mutual recognition offers a fourth approach to
international securities regulation.
Under a mutual recognition
approach, nations enter into treaties or other agreements under which
compliance with one signatory’s securities laws is viewed as compliance
with all signatories securities laws. The United States has flirted with a
mutual recognition approach to international securities regulation. In
2007, Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson, two staff members in the
SEC’s Office of International Affairs, published A Blueprint for CrossBorder Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework in the
Harvard International Law Journal. 50 Tafara and Peterson proposed a
framework to allow foreign financial service providers, i.e., foreign
exchanges and foreign broker–dealers, access to the United States
without having to register with the SEC, although they would remain
subject to the anti-fraud provisions of United States securities law.51
The proposed framework was based upon a system of substitute
compliance under which exemption from registration would be
permitted only when the financial service provider’s home country’s
securities laws and enforcement policies were comparable to those in
other participating nations. The proposed framework was warmly
received by the SEC under the leadership of Chairman Cox, and various
meetings were held to determine how the proposal might be

now global and that the dominance of the United States as the leading player in the global marketplace is
being challenged.”).
49. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 115 (“[C]ountries with quite similar regulatory systems may
expend very different amounts of resources on supervisory oversight.”).
50. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors:
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007).
51. Id. at 32 (“This Article proposes a new framework to apply to foreign financial service
providers accessing the U.S. capital market. . . . Rather than requiring such foreign stock exchanges and
foreign broker–dealers to register with the SEC, as is currently the case, the proposed framework relies
on a system of substituted compliance with SEC regulations.”).
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implemented. 52 Since the confirmation of Chairman Schapiro at the
beginning of 2009, however, enthusiasm for the proposal has cooled,
and the proposal appears to have been tabled. 53
Regulatory harmonization offers a fifth approach to international
securities regulation. Under a regulatory harmonization approach,
nations agree via treaties or other agreements to adopt identical or
substantially similar systems of securities regulation. Regulatory
harmonization can be used either to set a minimum level of regulation or
to set forth a comprehensive system of securities regulation. The
European Union has used a regulatory harmonization approach to
attempt to create a consistent system of securities regulation in its
member states. 54 European Union directives are enacted that require
member states to create regulation to achieve a particular result without
mandating the mechanism for achieving that result. 55 Although
regulatory harmonization is similar to strong regulatory convergence,
harmonization is different because it does not give nations as great of an
opportunity to experiment with how to achieve regulatory goals. The
ability to experiment is curtailed because harmonization requires
systems of securities regulation be identical or at least substantially
similar.
Regulatory centralization provides a final approach to international
securities law. Under a regulatory centralization approach, a centralized
regulator is created with monitoring, enforcement, and regulatory
powers. The United States used this approach domestically in the wake
of the stock market crash of 1929 when it enacted the Securities Act of
1933, 56 enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 57 and created the
SEC. This approach provided relative stability to the capital markets in
the United States for the remainder of the twentieth century. An
economic calamity similar to the Great Depression occurred only when
52. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1708–09 (“Following the publication of the Tafara article and
favorable comments upon it, the SEC held a Roundtable on Mutual Recognition. . . . Mutual recognition
of foreign markets and broker–dealers was also promoted in speeches by the Director of the Division of
Market Regulation.”); Pan, supra note 3, at 223 (“Since the publication of this proposal [by Tafara and
Peterson], SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and other senior SEC officials have openly discussed and
endorsed the merits of mutual recognition, and the SEC has held public meetings to discuss how such a
proposal should be implemented.”).
53. See Dan Jamieson, Schapiro Cool to ‘Mutual Recognition’ Efforts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb.
1, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090201/REG/302019997 (“Bold efforts by the
Bush administration Securities and Exchange Commission to open the doors to foreign brokerage firms
are likely to be put on hold by new Chairman Mary Schapiro.”).
54. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. 2009).
55. Id.
56. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
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regulatory fragmentation and competition emerged on the international
level as the result of globalization of capital markets.
C. The Dangers of Transitioning to a Regulatory Competition Model in
International Securities Regulation
Regulatory competition is often touted as helping to produce an
optimal level of regulation because innovation occurs as a result of the
tensions that exist among regulators to produce an optimal level of
regulation. In some areas, regulatory competition is especially useful
because the parties being regulated do not have the lobbying power to
pressure regulators to work toward a more efficient regulatory system.
For example, in the area of criminal law, no politician ever runs on a
pro-crime platform, so penalties tend to increase unless some state or the
federal government experiments and finds a lower level of punishment
has greater benefits. In the context of securities regulation, however,
issuers and investors put pressure upon regulators to innovate and
provide an optimal level of regulation, and therefore, regulatory
competition is less necessary, although it still may provide some
benefits. In the context of international securities regulation, even if a
regulatory competition approach might provide some benefits, these
benefits are offset by the fact that regulatory fragmentation of securities
law produces a race-to-the-bottom, regulatory and enforcement gaps,
and collective action problems. Of course, even in a harmonized and
centralized system, most of the benefits regulatory competition can still
be maintained if the centralized regulator simply sets a basic level of
regulation from which individual nations can upwardly depart, if they
desire.
A regulatory competition approach to international securities
regulation produces a race-to-the-bottom in international securities law.
Although a myriad of causes exist for the financial crisis that began in
2008, one of the central causes was the under-regulation of the
mortgage-backed securities that were held by a variety of financial
institutions at the time the crisis began. Regulators in the United States
did not want to ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed
securities fearing that it would add to the waning dominance of the
United States’ capital markets. 58 Regulators in other nations did not
want to ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed
securities fearing that it would disadvantage their particular nation’s
ability to participate in the economic prosperity of the early years of the
58. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (explaining the race-to-the-bottom in
international securities regulation that helped give birth to the financial crisis that began in 2008).
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millennium. 59
The Obama Administration has admitted that the financial crisis that
began in 2008 was partially the result of a race-to-the-bottom in
international financial regulation. In June 2009, the United States
Department of the Treasury issued its white paper report on the financial
crisis, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (the Report). 60
The drafters of the Report state the following about the evils of
regulatory fragmentation:
As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread
easily and quickly across national boundaries. Yet, regulation is still set
largely in a national context. Without consistent supervision and
regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their activities to
jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and
intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial system. 61

Although the Obama Administration acknowledged the dangers of
fragmented financial regulation in the Report, it failed to include a
recommendation for the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law. 62 As a result, a race-to-the-bottom in
international securities law will continue to exist until harmonization
and centralization occurs.
A regulatory competition approach to international securities law also
produces regulatory and enforcement gaps because of the patchwork of
regulation that it creates. Although some gaps can be filled by
international agreements and extraterritorial application of securities
laws, patchwork regulation still leaves barriers to the development of a
seamless global system of regulation. In addition, even if all nations
adopt similar systems of securities regulation, this does not ensure a
consistent level of enforcement. Regulatory and enforcement gaps can
be filled only by the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of
securities law to provide consistent monitoring, regulation, and
enforcement.
A regulatory competition approach to international securities
regulation also creates various collective action problems. Any
59. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (detailing the Obama Administration’s
acknowledgement that the financial crisis that began in 2008 was partially the result of a race-to-thebottom in international securities regulation).
60. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13.
61. See id. at 80 (discussing the need to raise international regulatory standards and improve
international cooperation in response to the financial crisis that began in 2008).
62. See id. at 80–88 (explaining the Obama Administration’s proposals for raising international
regulatory standards and improving international cooperation in response to the financial crisis in 2008,
which does not include a proposal for the harmonization and centralization of international securities
law).
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fragmented system of regulation creates free rider problems in which
some actors will fail to invest in adequate levels of regulation and
enforcement based on the belief that other actors will address any issues
that arise. In addition, regulatory fragmentation can also create a
bystander effect in which various actors witnessing the same issue fail to
act because of the belief that other actors will address the issue. A
harmonized and centralized system approach to international securities
law remedies these and other collective action problems by creating a
centralized salient entity to be a driving force in monitoring, regulation,
and enforcement.
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW
Ideally, the world should adopt a system of international securities
law based on harmonization and centralization. Nations throughout the
world should harmonize their systems of securities law to allow for the
existence of a centralized global securities regulator, and then these
nations should negotiate treaties or other agreements to bring such a
regulator into being. The centralized global securities regulator should
have robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers allowing it
to replace the current patchwork of regulation. The centralized global
securities regulator should set a baseline of regulation from which
nations could choose to upwardly depart.
Although such an approach might seem drastic and unrealistic
because of the current nationalistic and protectionist attitudes of most
countries, harmonization and centralization offers the best approach to
international securities law because it minimizes systemic risk in the
emerging global capital markets, benefits market participants, and
allows the United States to retain a central role in international securities
regulation. With that said, the emergence of harmonization and
centralization in international securities law is likely to be a long-term
evolutionary process, rather than a short-term revolutionary process,
because a significant amount of time will be required to allow the
current nationalistic and protectionist attitudes of most countries to
dissipate.
A. Harmonization and Centralization Minimizes Systemic Risk in the
Emerging Global Capital Markets
The emerging global capital markets allow capital to flow throughout
the world more efficiently, which creates a plethora of opportunities for
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issuers, investors, and other market participants. 63 As evidenced by the
financial crisis that began in 2008, however, the emergence of global
capital markets creates new risks because any future financial crisis is
likely to be global. 64
The harmonization and centralization of
international securities law offers the best method for minimizing the
new global risks created by the emerging global capital markets. This is
because harmonization and centralization ends the international race-tothe-bottom in securities regulation, eliminates regulatory and
enforcement gaps, and increases investor confidence.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law
would end the race-to-the-bottom that has emerged as the world has
begun to transition to a regulatory competition approach to international
securities regulation. As previously explained, one of the major causes
of the financial crisis that began in 2008 was that no nation wanted to
ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed securities that
were at the heart of the crisis. The United States did not want to ratchet
up the level of regulation fearing that it would hurt economic growth in
the United States and that it would lead to a loss of dominance in terms
of its capital markets. Other nations did not want to ratchet up the level
of regulation on mortgage-backed securities fearing that it would
disadvantage their nation or region from reaping the benefits of the
mortgage-backed securities. Under a model based on harmonization and
centralization of international securities law, this race-to-the-bottom
would be prevented. Securities regulators would no longer opt for
suboptimal levels of regulation in hopes of attracting issuers, investors,
and other market participants to their particular nation or region because
a centralized global regulator would exist to set a consistent level of
regulation.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law also
helps minimize the global systemic risk created by the emerging global
capital markets because they eliminate the regulatory and enforcement
gaps created by the current patchwork of national regulation. In the
previous Part, six possible approaches to international securities law
were discussed. 65 In the approaches based solely on privatization,
63. See Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 99 (“The rapid pace of technological advances is
bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital market. In such a world, investors would
have access to increased liquidity, greater diversification, and a wider range of investment options
regardless of their location. Capital would be more efficiently allocated throughout the global economy
to the benefit of all participants.”).
64. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 33 (1999) (“Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have become
international, just like trading markets.”).
65. See supra Part II.B (discussing six possible models for international securities law, including
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competition, convergence, mutual recognition, and harmonization,
regulation remains fragmented between securities regulators, which
allows for regulatory and enforcement gaps. 66 These regulatory and
enforcement gaps are not only created by territoriality issues but also
from various collective action problems that occur in the absence of a
dominant actor. For example, each of these five approaches generates
free rider problems in which nations are likely to attempt to be free
riders, rather than investing the time and resources to work for an
optimal level of international regulation and enforcement. 67 Moreover,
without a dominant actor, each of these five approaches permits a
bystander effect in which nations witnessing international regulatory and
enforcement issues assume that other nations will address the problem. 68
When harmonization is coupled with centralization, however, the
regulatory and enforcement gaps vanish because regulation is no longer
fragmented. Hence, under a harmonization and centralization model, the
emerging global capital markets and the newly-created transnational
exchanges can be consistently and completely regulated.
A harmonization and centralization model of international securities
law also helps minimize the global systemic risk created by the
emerging global securities markets because it increases investor
confidence. Securities markets are largely confidence driven. 69 Major
fluctuations in investor confidence can lead to bubbles or depressions. 70
A relatively high and stable level of investor confidence is optimal
because it motivates investors to invest and motivates investors to hold
their investments. 71
privatization, competition, convergence, mutual recognition, harmonization, and centralization).
66. See also Karmel, supra note 64, at 39 (“In globalized capital markets, many violations of
securities laws are transnational. This means that unless national laws are given extraterritorial effect,
there will be inadequate law enforcement, but if laws are applied extraterritorially, there will be conflict
between regulators and confusion on the part of regulated persons as to what are the proper rules.”).
67. See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 204 (“When trading is heavily fragmented, no nation is
able to capture enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation. It is a classic free rider
problem.”).
68. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1008 (2004) (describing the “bystander effect” as a phenomenon in which entities
“do not rush to assist others in danger or need, especially when there is no clear indication that it is their
duty to do so”).
69. See Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading Via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11
(1999) (“Securities markets play a significant role in the economic life of the U.S. and the world. The
growing importance of the securities markets is a direct result of investor confidence in those markets.”).
70. See generally Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 419 (2006) (providing an analysis of the role of
confidence and trust in the creation of bubbles and recessions).
71. See id. at 419 (explaining that the concept of “investor confidence . . . captures a deeper
insight that a functioning market depends on investor trust in the integrity of that market and its
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Patchwork regulation does not create a relatively high and stable level
of investor confidence. Most investors will choose not to invest or will
choose to sell investments quickly if they believe that: (1) they have
inadequate information; (2) they are going to be the victim of fraud; or
(3) they are going to lose their investment based on unforeseen market
fluctuations. 72 Patchwork regulation promotes all of these beliefs. First,
patchwork regulation encourages the belief among investors that they
have inadequate information because it adds information gathering costs
and makes understanding the regulatory environment more difficult. 73
Second, patchwork regulation encourages the belief among investors
that they are going to be the victim of fraud or other abuse because
patchwork regulation allows for regulatory and enforcement gaps
between nations. 74 It also allows issuers and broker-dealers to choose
regulatory regimes that are most favorable to themselves, rather than
investors. 75 Third, patchwork regulation encourages the belief among
investors that they are going to lose their investment based on
unforeseen market fluctuations because no centralized, salient entity
exists to monitor the entire global capital market and take action, if
needed. 76
A model of international securities law based on
institutions”).
72. See id. (“If investors fear being defrauded by issuers, broker dealers, exchanges or other
market intermediaries, or that the investment odds are otherwise rigged, they will no longer invest in the
stock market.”); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2004) (“Investor
confidence is, in part, built on assurances of honesty and full disclosure. If investors believe that the
information incorporated into the prices of stocks in the market is suspect, and if investors believe that
stock prices are based on biased, inaccurate information, who will continue to invest in the market?”).
73. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 48 (“[W]hile current U.S. laws and securities
regulations do not directly limit U.S. investor access to foreign investment opportunities, in practice,
access is constrained by . . . [a] lack of information about foreign investment opportunities because
foreign financial service providers (and issuers) are not able to directly solicit American retail investors
and U.S.-registered broker–dealers are unable to offer American investors information about or research
on foreign investment products unless investors directly (and specifically) request such information.”).
74. See id. at 32 (“As foreign markets develop and adopt higher regulatory standards, U.S.
investors predictably are looking at them as potential investment opportunities. However, the current
international environment has enforcement and oversight gaps that present risks that do not exist in a
domestic context.”).
75. See Pan, supra note 3, at 235 (“A . . . concern is that any difference in regulatory standards
between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction will give rise to regulatory arbitrage. Less
rigorous foreign regulation will favor foreign exchanges and broker–dealers over U.S. exchanges and
broker–dealers and encourage U.S. market participants to establish operations abroad to take advantage
of the regulatory differences.”).
76. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 42 (“For the past seventy two years, investors (both
American and foreign) have expected U.S. capital markets to be overseen by a regulator with strong
enforcement powers and be subject to corporate disclosure requirements based on a robust, high-quality,
comprehensive set of accounting standards. . . . This is not always the case abroad, particularly in
markets lacking adequate liquidity, where the public float of most traded companies is small, or where
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harmonization and centralization offers the best solution to stabilizing
the emerging global securities markets and minimizing the systemic risk
created by those markets because it would promote investor confidence
by creating a cohesive system of regulation that would be monitored and
enforced by a centralized, salient entity.
B. Harmonization and Centralization Benefits Market Participants
Beyond helping minimize the systemic risk created by the emerging
global securities markets, a model of international securities law based
on harmonization and centralization would also help benefit market
participants in a variety of other ways. Such a model would create a
cohesive system of international securities law that would replace the
current patchwork of international securities regulation. 77 This cohesive
system of international securities law would help market participants by
reducing transaction costs, increasing market efficiency, and reducing
the spillover risk of localized market failures.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law
would help reduce transaction costs for exchanges, investors, broker–
dealers, issuers, and market regulators. In regard to securities
exchanges, the completion of the merger between the New York Stock
Exchange and Euronext on April 4, 2007 started a wave of transnational
securities exchange consolidations. 78
Without harmonization and
centralization, however, costly barriers remain to the full integration of
these exchanges because the consolidated exchanges remain subject to
the localized securities laws of the countries in which they operate. 79
Moreover, in the absence of harmonization and centralization, issuers
face added transaction costs to obtain the benefit of cross-border
financing because they must adhere to the laws of each jurisdiction in
which they choose to sell securities. 80 Similarly, broker–dealers, who
laws against market manipulation are poorly enforced.”).
77. See supra Part II.B (discussing six possible models for international securities regulation).
78. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing the merger between the New York
Stock Exchange and Euronext and the wave of transnational securities exchange consolidations that
occurred after the merger was completed).
79. See Greene, supra note 31, at 97 (“The SEC must acknowledge that the securities markets
have evolved beyond jurisdictional borders and that its current regulatory regime has resulted in barriers
to competition and placed roadblocks in the way of investor access to cross-border investment
opportunities that have contributed to increased cost and market inefficiencies.”); Pan, supra note 37, at
137 (“The utmost economic benefits of the [New York Stock Exchange and Euronext] merger will be
realized only if the exchanges are able to consolidate trading into one platform with a single order book,
thereby achieving economies of scale and maximizing liquidity.”).
80. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 118 (“To date, most economic research on globalization of
capital markets has explored the benefits of cross-border financings to issuers. Hence, a common
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choose to operate in multiple jurisdictions, also face the added expense
of complying with the securities laws of each of these jurisdictions. 81
These added expenses of issuers and broker–dealers are of course passed
along to investors. 82 Investors also face the added burden of gathering
and interpreting information in a fragmented regulatory regime, 83 and
investors must pay the expense of complying with a patchwork of
regulation when they choose to sell their securities. 84 Moreover,
securities regulators shoulder the added expense of operating in a
fragmented regulatory regime that creates a multitude of issues with
effective monitoring, regulation, and enforcement. Harmonization and
centralization would eliminate many of these costs by creating a
cohesive and understandable system of international securities
regulation.
Under a model of international securities law based on harmonization
and centralization, market participants also benefit from the increased
efficiency of the emerging global capital markets. Such a model
increases market liquidity, which deepens the pool of capital available to
issuers and reduces the cost of obtaining that capital. 85 Transactions
between issuers and investors can be quickly and easily completed, and
a seamless global capital market could emerge. 86
Finally, a model of international securities regulation based on
harmonization and centralization also benefits market participants
because it reduces the potential spillover risk of localized market failures
measure of the benefits of globalization is the reduction in the cost of capital for issuers.”).
81. See also Greene, supra note 31, at 86 (“The current U.S. regulatory scheme makes crossborder investment costly and inefficient.”).
82. Id.
83. See also Jackson, supra note 25, at 111 (“Aside from technical barriers, U.S. retail investors
face serious problems receiving information about foreign investment opportunities. Most notably,
foreign broker dealers are prohibited from soliciting most U.S. retail investors unless those firms comply
with SEC registration and compliance requirements.”).
84. See also Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 48 (“[O]ver the past two years, U.S. retail
investment abroad has surged dramatically, mostly as a result of investors seeking higher overseas
returns made possible by the devaluation of the U.S. dollar. However, the process can be cumbersome
and comparatively expensive.”).
85. See Greene, supra note 31, at 88 (“Issuers, both within and outside the United States, will
gain access to a wider pool of investors and benefit from a reduced cost of capital.”). But see Jackson,
supra note 25, at 118 (“While lower capital costs presumably benefit consumers through higher
economic growth, the benefits are not entirely obvious to the consumers in countries like the United
States where foreign issuers come to raise their capital. Indeed, foreign issuers could end up competing
with domestic firms for scarce domestic capital and forcing local firms to pay more for their capital.”).
86. See Greene, supra note 31, at 88 (“Breaking down the barriers between U.S. financial
markets and comparably regulated non-U.S. financial markets will benefit both U.S. and non-U.S.
market participants. U.S. investors will benefit from more efficient execution of transactions in nonU.S. securities. Non-U.S. investors will similarly benefit from more efficient execution of transactions
in U.S. securities.”).
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or other financial crises. As previously discussed, the capital markets
are now global. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, any
future financial crisis is likely to be global as well. 87 This also means
that localized market failures or other financial crises can easily
spillover and have global consequences. 88 The creation of a centralized
global securities regulator reduces this risk because such a regulator
would provide additional monitoring of the world’s financial markets
and would have the power to act globally to prevent or reduce the
impact of any localized market failure or other financial crisis.
C. Harmonization and Centralization Allows the United States to
Maintain a Central Role in International Securities Regulation
An additional benefit of a model of international securities law based
on harmonization and centralization is that it would allow the United
States to maintain a central role in international securities regulation. Of
course, allowing the United States to maintain a central role in
international securities regulation benefits the United States because it
would give the United States power in a harmonized and centralized
system of international securities law, instead of allowing its influence
to continue to dwindle under the emerging international system of
regulatory competition. Allowing the United States to play a central role
in international securities regulation also benefits the rest of the world
because it gives the world the benefit of the United States’ experience as
a securities regulator and allows the United States to export its theories
of market regulation. Hence, the current patchwork of inconsistent
international securities regulation would be replaced with a system of
cohesive regulation with similarities to the system of regulation that kept
the capital markets in the United States relatively stable for much of the
twentieth century.
A model based on harmonization and centralization would allow the
United States to shape the global markets based on its experience as a
securities regulator. For much of the twentieth century, the United
States was viewed as having the world’s premier capital markets and the
world’s premier system of securities regulation. During the twentieth
century, the United States transitioned from a system of regulatory
competition among state regulators to a system of centralized regulation

87. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 112 (“An interesting challenge in the regulation of foreign
investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when things go wrong overseas,
like the Parmalat scandal or the Asian financial crisis of 1997.”).
88. Id.
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with the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 89 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 90 This transition resulted from the stock market
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. 91 The financial downturn that
began in 2008, which arguably should be characterized as a depression,
came into being in part because of the globalization of financial markets
and the development of a patchwork of regulation on the international
level. A harmonized and centralized model of international securities
regulation would provide a similar solution to the regulation of the
emerging global capital markets as the approach that worked to keep the
securities markets relatively stable in the United States for much of the
twentieth century. In structuring this harmonized and centralized
system, the world would gain the benefit of the United States’
experience during the twentieth century.
A harmonized and centralized system of international securities
regulation would permit the United States to export its theories of
market regulation as it negotiated with other securities regulators
throughout the world to allow for the existence of a centralized global
securities regulator. The United States would be able to play a leading
role in international securities law by allowing its voice to be heard in
this process. Although the United States was able to fuel weak
regulatory convergence in international securities regulation during
much of the twentieth century because of having the world’s premier
capital markets and premier system of securities regulation, the United
States’ dominance is now waning. Its best hope to maintain a leading
role in international securities regulation is to advocate for
harmonization and centralization. Ultimately, playing a role in this
process will benefit the rest of the world because harmonization and
centralization based on the market regulation theories used by the United
States during much of the twentieth century offer the best hope for
minimizing the systemic risk in the emerging global securities markets.
IV. AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW
Although a strong argument exists for the harmonization and
centralization of international securities law, two complaints are

89. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
91. See also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1135,
1139 (2006) (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
including preventing “national emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices”).
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commonly made against such an approach, which can be rebutted. First,
opponents of harmonization and centralization argue that such an
approach prevents the regulatory innovation that is yielded through
regulatory competition. However, the tensions among regulators,
issuers, and investors create pressures to find an optimal level of
regulation because each group has the political power to push for either
regulation or deregulation.
In addition, under the model of
harmonization and centralization proposed in this Article, regulatory
competition is not completely prohibited because the centralized global
regulator would create only a baseline of regulation from which
individual nations could upwardly depart. Second, opponents of
harmonization and centralization and those who simply resign
themselves to the current system of international securities law argue
that harmonization and centralization is not feasible because most
regulators would be unwilling to eschew current nationalistic and
protectionist tendencies to allow such a system of international securities
regulation to come into being.
Although harmonization and
centralization may be a drastic and unrealistic approach in the shortterm, such an approach becomes feasible if it is allowed to emerge
through a long-term evolutionary process. In this Part, two case studies
of long-term evolutionary institution building will be presented; the
commonalities between these case studies will be discussed; and a
number of possible paths toward the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law will be explored.
A. Two Case Studies Illustrating the Value of an Evolutionary Approach
to Institution Building
A long-term evolutionary approach to the development of a
harmonized and centralized system of international securities regulation
might seem odd in comparison to the relatively rapid pace at which
global capital markets have developed. 92
However, such an
evolutionary approach offers the best and perhaps the only way that such
a system of international securities law might emerge. Often, the
building of institutions takes a series of stages and transitions prior to
the emergence of an effective and lasting body. The development of
securities regulation in the United States and the development of
securities regulation in the European Union offer two case studies
illustrating the value of an evolutionary approach to institution building.
The development of securities regulation in the United States reflects

92. See supra Part II.A (describing the emergence of global capital markets).
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an evolutionary process involving a variety of stages and transitions.
During the 1700s, the 1800s, and the first decade of 1900s, the United
States did not have codified systems of securities law. Instead, the
United States employed a privatization approach to securities regulation
under which securities exchanges determined rules governing issuers,
investors, and other market participants. In addition, general provisions
of tort and criminal law were used to prohibit fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities. This approach to securities regulation proved
ineffective in preventing fraud, and in 1911, Kansas passed the first state
statute providing for securities regulation. 93 This statute became
commonly referred to as a blue sky law, along with all other
subsequently passed state statutes that focus on securities regulation. 94
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, as the United States took a regulatory
competition approach to securities law, “blue sky laws” began to appear
throughout the United States and formed a patchwork of regulation that
was largely ineffective in preventing securities fraud. 95 Although
federal securities regulation was discussed during this period, it was
viewed as unrealistic until the stock market crash of 1929. 96 In response
to the stock market crash, Congress adopted a harmonized and
centralized approach to security law and passed the Securities Act of
1933 97 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 98 Notably, § 4(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC, a centralized
administrative agency charged with overseeing the regulation and
enforcement of securities laws in the United States. 99 As a result of this
harmonized and centralized approach, the markets in the United States
remained relatively stable until the financial downturn that began in
2008, which arguably occurred because of regulatory fragmentation on

93. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[2] (6th ed. 2009) (“[I]n
1911, Kansas passed the first state securities statutory regulatory scheme. This, like subsequent
securities legislation in other states, has come to be known as a ‘blue sky law.’”).
94. Id.
95. See also Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser–Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843,
851 (2009) (“Prior to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, individual states were the main forces in
regulating securities. The state statutes were and are commonly referred to as ‘blue sky laws,’ and prior
to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the state statutes created an inconsistent patchwork of
securities regulation that was largely ineffective in preventing fraud.”).
96. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 1.2[2] (“Following enactment of the early state securities laws,
federal legislation was successfully resisted for a while. However, the stock market crash of 1929 is
properly described as the straw that broke the camel’s back. The era that followed ushered in federal
securities regulation.”).
97. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
98. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (providing for the establishment of the SEC).
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the international level.
The development of securities regulation in the European Union
offers a second example of the value of an evolutionary approach to
institution building. Securities regulation in Europe dates back to at
least the thirteenth century. 100 Despite this long history, securities
regulation and securities markets in Europe remained a national
phenomenon until the second half of the twentieth century. 101 In 1957,
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) helped
found the European Communities, which was the predecessor to the
European Union, and stated that one of its purposes was the “abolition,
as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of
persons, services and capital.” 102 Despite this mandate, interest in the
development of transnational securities markets in Europe remained
limited until the mid-1980s. 103 In 1985, the Commission of the
European Communities issued its white paper report, Completing the
Internal Market. 104 This report led to the Single European Act, which
amended the EC Treaty to make it easier to pass directives to member
states requiring them to harmonize their securities laws. 105 The
completion of a transnational securities market did not occur until after
the Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht,
was signed in 1992. 106 In November 1999, the European Commission
issued an action plan noting several shortcomings of the existing system
of securities regulation in the European Union. 107 In July 2000, based
on the information contained in the action plan, the European Council
appointed the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets. 108 Ultimately, the Committee of Wise Men
100. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 1.2[1] (describing the development of securities regulation in
England, including that “[r]egulation of securities brokers dates back to the thirteenth century”).
101. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 110 (explaining that for much of the twentieth century the
securities markets in Europe were “fragmented, relatively uninterested in equity securities—especially at
the retail level—and not receptive to long-term debt financing”).
102. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3(c), Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
103. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104. Comm’n of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from
the Commission of the European Council, COM (1985) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
105. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986).
106. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
107. Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final
(May 11, 1999).
108. See Caroline Bradley, Consumers of Financial Services and Multi-Level Regulation in the
European Union, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1212 , 1220 (2008) (“The Economic and Financial Affairs
Council [of the Council of the European Union] . . . appointed a Committee of Wise Men, led by Baron
Lamfalussy, to rethink the EU’s processes for developing financial policy, and this committee proposed
a new system which would distinguish framework measures and detailed implementing rules.”).
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recommended the creation of the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR). 109 On July 6, 2001, acting upon this advice, the
European Commission decided to create CESR to serve as a centralizing
force in securities regulation in the European Union. 110 As outlined on
its website, CESR’s role was to:


Improve co-ordination among securities regulators:
developing effective operational network mechanisms to
enhance day to day consistent supervision and enforcement of
the Single Market for financial services . . .



Act as an advisory group to assist the EU Commission: in
particular in its preparation of draft implementing measures of
EU framework directives in the field of securities;



Work to ensure more consistent and timely day-to-day
implementation of community legislation in the Member
States . . . 111

As a result of the financial downturn that began in 2008, a successor to
CESR was proposed. 112 CESR was replaced by the European Securities
and Markets Authority, an entity with more robust regulatory powers,
which increased the harmonization and centralization of securities
regulation in the European Union. 113
B. The Common Characteristics of the Two Case Studies
Although the development and the political climates of the United
States and the European Union vary dramatically, certain commonalities
emerge from studying the evolution of their systems of securities
regulation. These commonalities include evolution based on political
109. Comm. of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, at 19 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf.
110. Commission Decision 2001/527, Establishing the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43, 44 (EC).
111. CESR in Short, http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last
visited June 22, 2010).
112. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009).
113. Regulation 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 O.J.
(L
331)
84.
See
also
ESMA,
About
Us,
http://www.esma.europa.eu/
index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
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stress, evolution based on the failure of institutions to achieve their
intended goals, and a consistent trajectory toward harmonization and
centralization. These commonalities suggest a path for international
securities regulation toward harmonization and centralization that may
ultimately be a natural progression, although recognition and
understanding of it may help make the transition to a harmonized and
centralized system of international securities regulation easier.
In both the United States and the European Union, securities
regulation has evolved based on political stress. The United States
transitioned from a privatized system of securities regulation to a system
of regulatory competition based on state law because of fears of fraud
within the privatized system. 114 Then, the United States transitioned
from a regulatory competition approach to securities regulation to a
system of centralized regulation based on outcry over the stock market
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. 115 Similarly, the European
Union transitioned from a system of regulatory competition among
member states to a harmonized system of securities regulation based on
outcry over failing to meet the edicts of the EC Treaty to achieve a
common market among member states, 116 and then transitioned to a
harmonized and centralized approach with the creation of CESR when
the creation of a common market continued to be elusive. 117 Finally, the
European Union is moving toward greater centralization with the
creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority because of
the financial crisis that began in 2008. 118 For both the United States and
the European Union, political stress was required to reach the next
evolutionary stage.
For a harmonized and centralized system of international securities
regulation to emerge, political stress will need to fuel the process. For
this to occur, widespread concern over fraud in the global securities
markets or a series of financial crises will likely need to occur. Crisis
has traditionally created change in securities regulation. With that said,
the nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of most securities
regulators throughout the world are deeply engrained. For example,
although the financial crisis that began in 2008 has generated increased
interests in global entities, such as the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, it has not fueled a major push toward
harmonization and centralization on the international level. A series of
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
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crises will likely be required for harmonization and centralization to
become the dominant model of international securities law.
The evolution of securities regulation in both the United States and
the European Union also required failure of various institutions to meet
their intended goals. In the United States, failure of securities exchanges
to effectively address fraud in the securities markets caused a transition
to regulatory competition among the states. The failure of the states to
provide stability to the national securities markets led to the
centralization of securities regulation in the United States through the
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, 119 the enactment of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 120 and the creation of the SEC. 121 The
story is similar in the European Union. The failures of the European
Communities to achieve the edicts of the EC Treaty in part led to the
creation of the European Union, and the failure of the European Union
to achieve a common securities market led to the creation of CESR.
Finally, the failure of CESR to prevent the financial crisis that began in
2008 has led to a push for greater centralization with the creation of the
European Securities and Markets Authority.
The experiences of the United States and the European Union suggest
that various failures will occur on the path to the harmonization and
centralization of international securities regulation and that these failures
are likely a necessary part of the evolutionary process. To achieve
harmonization and centralization, the willingness to move slowly across
the spectrum of approaches to international securities regulation will be
required.
Finally, both the experiences of the United States and the European
Union demonstrate a consistent progression toward the harmonization
and centralization of securities regulation.
The United States
transitioned from privatization to regulatory competition to
centralization, and for most of the twentieth century its capital markets
remained relatively stable. The European Union has taken a similar
trajectory by transitioning from regulatory competition to harmonization
and centralization of its securities laws. The United States and the
European Union are now part of a global patchwork of securities laws,
and as a result of this patchwork, they are again faced with the dangers
of regulatory competition. The United States, the member states of the
European Union, and the other nations of the world must begin anew the
slow evolutionary process toward harmonization and centralization.

119. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (providing for the establishment of the SEC).
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C. Possible Paths to the Harmonization and Centralization of
International Securities Law
A slow evolutionary process offers the best chance that the
harmonization and centralization of international securities law will
occur. The issue that lingers is what the next step should be in the
process toward such a system of securities law. In fact, a myriad of
potential next steps exist. Any sort of action on the part of securities
regulators that fuels cooperation and coordination moves the current
system of international securities law based on regulatory competition
toward a system based on harmonization and centralization. Three
possible options include adopting a mutual recognition approach to
international securities regulation; developing multinational task forces
to assist in transnational enforcement of securities laws; and endowing
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with
more robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers.
One potential step toward the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law is to adopt the mutual recognition model of
securities regulation that was proposed by Tafara and Peterson. 122 As
previously explained, the proposed framework would allow foreign
securities exchanges and foreign broker–dealers access to the United
States without having to register with the SEC. 123 The foreign securities
exchange and foreign broker–dealer would be eligible for exemption
from registration only if its home country’s securities laws and
enforcement policies were comparable to those of the other participating
nations. Although this proposed framework would not create a
harmonized and centralized system of international securities law, the
framework would be a step toward such a system because of the
increased cooperation and coordination that would be created among
securities regulators participating in the mutual recognition framework.
A second potential step toward the harmonization and centralization
of international law would be to create multinational task forces to assist
in the transnational enforcement of securities regulation. Under this
model, nations would come together to create task forces that would be
composed of national securities regulators and would work to monitor
transnational securities issues. These task forces would be created by
treaties or other agreements and could be given investigatory power and
the standing to initiate suit in the event that a securities law violation is
122. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing proposal by Tafara and Peterson
for a mutual recognition framework).
123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the mutual recognition
framework proposed by Tafara and Peterson).
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believed to have occurred. This model falls short of a harmonized and
centralized system of international securities regulation because the task
forces would have to obey and enforce the national securities laws in
each jurisdiction in which it operated. However, this type of approach
could be an important step toward the eventual adoption of a
harmonized and centralized approach to international a securities law.
A third potential step toward the harmonization and centralization of
international law would be to endow the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with more robust monitoring,
regulatory, and enforcement powers. IOSCO was created in 1983 when
securities regulators from eleven countries in North and South America
decided to transform an inter-American association of securities
regulators into a global body. 124 Today, IOSCO is composed of
regulators from over 100 jurisdictions who regulate more than ninetyfive percent of the world’s securities markets. 125 IOSCO serves
monitoring and coordinating functions, rather than being a centralized
body for the creation and enforcement of securities law. 126 Compliance
with IOSCO’s efforts is voluntary unless an individual nation chooses to
adopt them. 127 One step toward a harmonized and centralized system of
international securities law would be to endow IOSCO with more robust
monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers. IOSCO has the
potential to be a force in the harmonization and centralization of
international securities law, but as currently composed, IOSCO has too
little power to serve this function.
Ultimately, anything that fuels the process toward harmonization and
centralization of international securities law is a positive, and no single
path to such a system of securities law is required. With that stated,
however, the world has begun to develop a seamless global capital
market. The end of international securities regulation must be to

124. See OICV–IOSCO, IOSCO Historical Background,, http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (“[IOSCO] was created in 1983 with the
decision to change from an inter-American regional association (created in 1974) into a global
cooperative body. Eleven securities regulatory agencies from North and South America took [sic] this
decision in April 1983 at a meeting in Quito, Ecuador.”).
125. Id. (“Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities markets and it is the
primary international cooperative forum for securities market regulatory agencies. IOSCO members are
drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdictions and its membership continues to grow.”).
126. See OICV–IOSCO, About Us, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Jan. 20, 2011)
(providing an overview of IOSCO’s main purposes).
127. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf; INT’L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf.
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develop a seamless global system of securities law to regulate that
market.
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